

Africa Report

February, 1961

STRAIN OF CONGO
OPERATIONS

REST
OPS

Kasavubu Claims UAR Interferes in Congo

U.S. and the U.N.

No Major Changes Are Seen, But More
Flexible Attitude Is Promised

Le désordre
et Haile
Selassié

Towards One-Party Rule
In French West Africa

Independence Year

Ruanda Group Deposes
King, Sets Up Republic

WOMEN'S VOTE MAY SWAY RESULT
OF CAMEROONS PLEBISCITE

CHOICE BETWEEN NIGERIA AND REPUBLIC

To Fill Critical Shortage

U. S. to Send 150 Teachers
To 4 African Territories

Nasser Seeks
Role in Africa

EARLY CLASH LIKELY
S. RHODESIA TALKS

MR. NKOMO INTENT ON RAISING
FRANCHISE ISSUE

Lumumba Held Vital
To Congo Settlement

WANADAI JOMO AACHIWE
Madakta Banda na Nyerere

DAILY
GRAPHIC

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Inflation

Increase Tied
Higher Army Pay

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GHANA TROOPS TO
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CONGO FORCE?

MR. LUMUMBA
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IN POOR PHYSICAL
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French-Speaking Tropical Africa Revises Its Political Institutions

A strong executive, backed up by a legislative branch comprised largely or entirely of members of the governing party is the emerging constitutional pattern in the four French-speaking states which form the West African *Conseil de l'Entente*. While there is nothing inherently undemocratic in the juridical and institutional framework being created in Ivory Coast, Niger, Upper Volta, and Dahomey constitutions have been drafted with local political realities as well as the further ambitions of leaders now dominating the political scene clearly in mind.

The constitutions of the four *Entente* countries are substantially the same. All provide for a presidential form of government in which the President of the Republic is *détenteur exclusif du pouvoir exécutif*. In Ivory Coast and Dahomey, the President and unicameral Legislative Assembly are to be elected for five years on a majority list. That is, each party proposes a slate of candidates and the voter casts his ballot for the party, not for an individual local candidate. The party receiving the most votes automatically takes 100 percent of the Assembly. The President, who is both chief of state and chief of government, is in each case the one who conducts policy and initiates laws, and he may resort to "exceptional methods" should the national security be at stake.

In Upper Volta and Niger similar constitutions have been adopted. However, a *disposition transitoire* by popular referendum gave to the Legislative Assembly in these two countries the power to elect the first President under the new constitution in a five-year mandate.

The constitutions of all four *Entente* countries give the executive a great deal of leeway in "association and cooperation with other states," namely authority to conclude agreements for "intergovernmental organs of common administration, coordination and free cooperation" in the fields of (1) monetary, economic and financial politics, (2) establishment of customs unions, (3) creation of "funds of solidarity" (i.e., joint funds with other states for development or other common purposes), (4) development planning, (5) foreign policy, (6) national defense, (7) judicial organization, (8) higher education, (9) labor legislation, and (10) transportation and communications.

Although these provisions are apparently included in the four constitutions primarily to allow for the participation of each country in the *Conseil de l'Entente*, the *Entente* is nowhere mentioned by name in any constitution. Thus, the provisions deal-

ing with intergovernmental cooperation presumably could serve also as a basis for negotiations with France or any other nation. The *Entente* countries have not yet negotiated post-independence accords with France and thus are not now members of the French Community.

Independence brought no legal changes in the mechanics of the *Entente*, which has a rotating President elected annually and a small administrative secretariat. The *Entente* was established officially on May 29, 1959 as a kind of anti-federalist grouping designed to counter the now defunct Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan. Felix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, who is the moving force behind the *Entente*, was the first President. Hamani Diori of Niger served in 1960, and Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta will preside during the current year. Barring some unforeseen change, Dahomey's turn will come in 1962.

The main achievements of the *Entente* have been the creation of a customs union ("the Benelux of Africa") and of a solidarity fund to which all the *Entente* members contribute as their resources permit and which is apportioned on the basis of need. In effect, this fund is a subsidization by the Ivory Coast of its three poorer partners.

Recent elections in the *Entente* countries resulted in only minor changes in the political alignments existing at the time of independence. On November 27, 1960, elections held in Ivory Coast under the new constitution adopted October 14, 1960 returned Houphouët-Boigny to power by 99 percent of the total vote cast and the 70 candidates of his Democratic Party of the Ivory Coast (PDCI) to the National Assembly by 96 percent. No other party nominated any candidates for election.

In Upper Volta elections were also held on November 27 to approve the new constitutional provisions for a presidential system of government in which the chief of state is elected by direct universal suffrage. President Maurice Yameogo was first elected on April 25, 1959 by the Legislative Assembly and reconfirmed on December 8 under the *disposition transitoire*. The members of his 13-man Council are all drawn from the ruling *Union Démocratique Voltaïque*.

A situation similar to that of Upper Volta exists in Niger, where Hamani Diori has been in power since December 14, 1958, as the choice of the Legislative Assembly. The new constitution approved by referendum on November 27 and by the Assembly on November 28 specifies as a

(Continued on page 8)

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Patrice Lumumba

A Political Post-Mortem?

By RENE LEMARCHAND*

During his short-lived apotheosis as Prime Minister of the first popularly-elected Congolese Government, Patrice Lumumba managed to create an image of himself which continues to energize his supporters and has already made him a near-legend among young nationalist militants far beyond the borders of the Congo.

Of all the leaders who suffered imprisonment at the hands of the Belgian colonial administration before 1960, Lumumba particularly embodies those qualities with which the Congolese masses would readily identify. This was not only due to the special aura generally conferred on politicians who serve sentences for engaging in "subversive activities" against a colonial regime, but to his personal charisma.

Equally effective in French, Ki-Swahili or Lingala, Lumumba possesses a rare ability to sense and articulate the demands of his public. His manipulative skills were especially impressive when he was confronting a partisan audience, but his talent for meeting a wide range of expectations was also striking when he addressed himself to a more diversified group.

The devotion of the rank and file of the *Mouvement National Congolais* to their leader is not a unique phenomenon among Congolese parties: what is significant is that he attracted the solid loyalties of a tribally-heterogeneous body of militants.

A "Natural" Politician

A born politician, Lumumba displayed early in his career an organizational bent which remains unmatched among other Congolese leaders. While other politicians tended to utilize their respective tribal associations as their access to the political arena, Lumumba entered politics by involving himself in broadly-based pre-political movements.

As early as 1951, he joined one of the most active and numerically-important of all the clubs of *evolues* in Orientale Province, the *Association des Evolues de Stanleyville*. He was in the same year appointed Secretary-General of the *Association des Postiers de la Province Orientale* (APIPO)—a professional organization of which he became a member while working as postal clerk in Stanleyville.

A couple of years later he held the post of Vice-Chairman of the

Association des Anciens Eleves des Peres de Scheut (ADPES), an alumni association grouping the former students of the Scheutist Missions. In 1955 he became chairman of both the *Association des Evolues* and the *Association du Personnel Indigene de la Colonie* of Stanleyville, an indigenous labor organization restricted to native functionaries. Following the visit of the Liberal Minister of the Colonies, Auguste Buisseret, to Stanleyville, Lumumba founded the *Amicale Liberale de Stanleyville* in 1956.


Education Limited

A member of the Batetela tribe, a Mongo sub-group, Lumumba was born on July 2, 1925 in Katako-Kombe in the Sankuru district of the Kasai Province. The fact that he only received a primary education did not prevent him, while employed in a Stanleyville post office, from making frequent contributions to local news-sheets, such as the *Stanleyvillois*, and to more widely-read publications, such as the *Voix du Congolais* and *Croix du Congo*. While the vast majority of Congolese writers of the period placed major emphasis on the cultural heritage of their own tribes, Lumumba's material emphasized—within the limits tolerated by Belgian officialdom—problems of racial, social, and economic discrimination.

His career as a postal clerk was suddenly interrupted on July 1, 1956 when he was arrested on the charge of embezzling 126,000 francs (\$2,200) from the Post Office funds and condemned to serve a two-year sentence in prison. On June 13, 1957 the sentence was commuted on appeal to 18 and finally to 12 months after the *evolues* of Stanleyville reimbursed the sum in question. Lumumba subsequently moved to Leopoldville where he found employment as the sales director of the *Bracongo* brewery (Polar beer).

Lumumba's sojourn in Leopoldville was a crucial phase in his political career. In 1958, while combining the functions of vice-chairman of a Liberal friendship society, the *Cercle Liberal d'Etudes et d'Agrement*, with those of President of the *Association des Batetela* of Leopoldville, he joined a Christian Democratic study group, the *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Sociales* (CERS), created in 1955 by the Secretary General of the *Jeunes Ouvrieres Chretiennes*, Jacques Meert. Among the more prominent members of the CERS were Joseph Ileo and Joseph Ngalula.

Ileo, editor-in-chief of the bi-monthly *Conscience Africaine*, had already acquired a wide renown among Congolese *evolues* when he



Patrice Lumumba


—Forum Service

decided, in July 1956, to publish a nationalist-inspired manifesto which contained a daring 30-year plan of emancipation for the Congo. Ngalula, editor of *Presence Congolaise*, a weekly publication affiliated to the Christian Democratic daily *Courrier d'Afrique*, was also associated with the founders of the *Mouvement National Congolais*, a moderate nationalist front organization, created in late 1956 and dedicated to the realization of the objectives mentioned in the "*manifeste de Conscience Africaine*."

As both Ileo and Ngalula were anxious to broaden the ideological bases of their movement in order to avoid the stigma of parochialism, they called on Socialist and Liberal sympathists to join their ranks. Thus it was that Cyrille Adoula, then associated with the Belgian General Federation of Labor, and Patrice Lumumba, who was regarded by the CERS members as the most eminent spokesman of Liberal ideas, joined the MNC.

Once affiliated to the front, Lu-

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Pro-Lumumba Area as of Late January
—Russell Lenz Map, Christian Science Monitor

mumba rapidly asserted himself as the dominant figure. Shortly after proclaiming himself chairman of the MNC's Central Committee, he formally announced—on October 10, 1958—the foundation of a “national movement” dedicated to the goal of “national liberation”. This initiative was prompted by two important developments. One was the forthcoming visit of a parliamentary committee appointed by the former Minister of the Congo, Mr. Petillon, for the purpose of “conducting an inquiry concerning the administrative and political evolution of the country.” Another was the creation of a *Mouvement Pour le Progres National Congolais* in late November 1958 by the Congolese delegates to the Brussels Exposition. This ephemeral nationalist front, which originated at the *Centre d'Accueil du Personel Africain* (CAPA) of Tervueren, included such potential leaders as Jean Bolikango (PUNA), Jason Sendwe (Balubakat), Jacques Massa (RDLK) and several others who enjoyed a unique opportunity to cut their political teeth during off-duty hours in Brussels and to exchange ideas on the future character of the Congolese polity. Acutely aware of the threat represented by this nucleus which had taken form in Brussels, Lumumba moved quickly to preempt the role of dynamic and radical nationalist leader.

In December 1958, he attended the Pan-African Conference in Accra and became a member of its Permanent Directing Committee. In addition to whatever personal counsel he might have received from Ghana's Prime Minister Nkrumah, there is little doubt that the Accra Conference was an important factor in shaping Lumumba's long-range objectives and further sensitizing him to pan-Africanism.

But the emancipation of the Congo from Belgium's tutelage assumed first

priority. Thus, in March 1959, when Belgium had already made clear its intention to lead the Congo “without fatal procrastination and without undue haste” towards self-government, Lumumba went to Brussels where he delivered several lectures under the auspices of *Presence Africaine* (a Belgian organization dedicated to the promotion of African culture). On this occasion, Lumumba deplored the “bastardization and destruction of Negro-African art” and the “depersonalization of Africa”, and reaffirmed his party's determination to put an end to the “camouflaged slavery” of Belgian colonization and elect an independent government in 1961.

This target-date, which had received the formal approval of the *Mouvement National Congolais* delegates to the Luluabourg Congress in April 1959, ran against the demands of other nationalist groups anxious to emulate the extremist claims made by the MNC leader. As the competition among parties reached an unprecedented scale, Lumumba became increasingly intransigent in his demands concerning the timing of a political transfer and increasingly inclined to arrogate to himself unfettered control over the affairs of his party.

As a result, a major schism occurred in the MNC in July 1959 when Albert Kalonji, Cyrille Adoula, and Joseph Ngalula withdrew their confidence from Lumumba and decided to set up their own moderate wing. With the defection of some of the most able elements of the MNC leadership, Lumumba necessarily became heavily involved in all phases of his party's activities—organizing local sections of the MNC, delivering campaign speeches, recruiting militants, whipping up support by whatever means were available to him.

Lumumba Imprisoned Again

On November 1, 1959, a few days after his wing of the MNC held its congress in Stanleyville, Lumumba was arrested for the second time, on the charge of having made seditious statements, and sentenced to six months in jail. He was released in late January when a delegation of MNC officials—headed, ironically enough, by a future dissident, Victor Nendaka—notified the Belgian Government that they would not participate in the Brussels Roundtable Conference unless their leader was freed. In the meantime, the success encountered by the MNC at the December 1959 elections had clearly marked off the Orientale Province as the main Lumumbist stronghold: in Stanleyville alone the MNC won 90 percent of the votes cast and 55 councillors' seats out of 73.

Lumumba's involvement in party activities was temporarily interrupted after his appointment as the representative of the Orientale Province to the General Executive College—an

interim executive body established after the Roundtable. Meanwhile, Victor Nendaka, who had held the position of Vice-Chairman in the party hierarchy, suddenly broke with Lumumba for what he termed the “extreme leftwing tendencies” of the party leader and in early April 1960 decided to organize his own independent faction. And yet, thanks to Lumumba's skill at political maneuvering, the Lumumba MNC emerged from the electoral struggle as the strongest in the House of Representatives, commanding 34 seats out of 137. It reached a dominant position in the Provincial Assembly of Orientale Province with 58 seats out of 70, and also acquired a strong representation in the Assemblies of the Kivu and Kasai Provinces where it managed to secure, respectively, 17 and 25 seats.

Tribal Support Sought

In spite of his repeated efforts to affirm the national vocation of his party, the campaign strategy laid out by Lumumba also shows that he was not unaware of the tactical advantages to be gained from proper manipulation of a tribal environment. Not only did he succeed in earning the support of those tribes which were related to his own, such as the Bakusu, Batetela, Bahamba, and Bangengele, but he adroitly exploited tribal conflicts to play one group off against the other. In the Kasai, for example, he won the sympathies of the Lulua by posing as their staunchest ally against the incursions of the Baluba, but this did not prevent him from wooing the support of a considerable proportion of Albert Kalonji's Baluba following by denouncing Kalonji's tribalist attitude as a threat to the unity of the Congo.

Among the several techniques employed by Lumumba to mobilize support and activate the rural masses, three stand out. First, there was the careful selection of party officials and propagandists according to ethnic criteria. In the Maniema and South-Kivu Districts, for example, a considerable number of small tribal entities rallied to the cause of the MNC—the Bakumu, the Bakwa-Luntu, the Bahemba, etc.—as a result of the discriminative appointment of *presidents sectionnaires* along tribal lines. Another technique consisted of establishing organizational links between certain tribal associations and the MNC. At the Lodja Congress, for example, held from March 9-12, 1960 it was agreed by the delegates of the Bakutshu and Batetela tribes that “they would entrust the defense of their interests to the political party which holds a dominant position in the region, namely the MNC.” The success achieved by the MNC-Lumumba among the Bakutshu and Batetela tribal associations was of course mainly due to Lumumba's tri-

(Continued on page 8)

A Reluctant February Bride?

The "Other Cameroons"

By VICTOR T. LE VINE

Yaounde
A difficult choice lies ahead for the 1,500,000 people of the British Cameroons, the last remaining UN Trusteeship in West Africa. In February, this small territory, wedged uncomfortably between Nigeria and the Cameroun Republic, must decide which of its two neighbors it wishes to join. The choice is complicated by conflicting ethnic loyalties, internal and external political pressures, and division of the territory into two distinct administrative entities, each of which must vote separately on the alternatives. If the two parts should go in different directions, a ticklish situation could become an untenable one.

The Historical Context

The unusual history of the British Cameroons and its peculiar backwater politics help explain the dilemma it now faces. The territory was born of the unequal partition of what was once one of Germany's proudest possessions in Africa, the Kamerun Protectorate. The Germans acquired the Kamerun in 1884, when Dr. Nachtigall won a celebrated boat race to Douala, arriving just five days before the hapless British envoy.

During World War I, Kamerun fell to British and French forces. By an ironic twist of history, England again lost out in the partition of the territory: the French received the lion's share, about four-fifths of the total area, while the British had to content themselves with two small discontinuous sections along the eastern border of Nigeria.

Isolated from both French Cameroun and Nigeria (though technically administered by the latter), the British Cameroons became something of a backwater for the Colonial Office. Its only fame seemed a negative one—British or Nigerian civil servants who failed to make the grade in Lagos were often "exiled" to Buea, capital of the Southern Cameroons, and, as many a story had it, "were never heard of again."

In 1922, both the British and French Cameroons became Mandated Territories under the League; in 1947 the two Mandates were converted into Trusteeships under the UN. The British Cameroons, idyllically lost between Nigeria and the Cameroun Mountains, failed to reap much benefit from being either a Mandate or a Trusteeship. Paradoxically, it was only the return *en masse*, after 1922, of the German planters who were dispossessed in 1916, that kept the territory from sinking completely into economic stagnation.


What economic development there

is in the territory is in the south, and was largely done by the Germans. The region's two small ports, most of its roads, bridges, and the small railroad were all built by the Germans before 1913 and still constitute the main avenues of communication. Most of the Southern Cameroons' wealth lies in its plantations of bananas, cocoa, palm oil, rubber, and coffee, now owned by the ubiquitous Cameroons Development Corporation (a statutory government-owned agency) and a small group of concessionaires. The CDC owns the bulk of the former German plantations in the Victoria-Tiko-Buea-Kumba area, some 250,000 acres of rich soil which owes its qualities to former eruptions of Mt. Cameroon, the sporadic volcano which dominates the Tiko plain. The

other industry of any size is lumbering, also conducted by concession companies.

The sum total of the territory's exports have not, however, served to make Tiko or Victoria into international ports. Even today few ships stop at these two cities, and the region continues to be largely out of the mainstream of West African commerce and development.

It is small wonder, then, that British Southern Cameroonian politics have always had a peculiarly defensive, provincial air. The combination of isolation and neglect produced a type of politician whose feathers ruffled at the merest slight and who stood ready to defend the Southern Cameroun patrimony against all comers. It was no accident that the first



political stirrings were directed against Nigeria, especially Eastern Nigeria, within whose embrace such Cameroonian politicians as Dr. E. M. Endeley, N. N. Mbile, and J. N. Foncha felt both smothered and disregarded. In 1953, Dr. Endeley led the Southern Cameroons representatives out of the Eastern Nigeria House of Assembly and out of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's powerful National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) party. A year later, the southern section of the territory attained regional status within the Nigerian federation.

UPC Enters Picture

Endeley, Mbile, and Foncha had parlayed the widespread anti-Ibo feeling in the south into regional status, and it was not long until another ingredient was added to the pot that Endeley and his Kamerun National Congress had started boiling. In 1955, the leaders of the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* (UPC), an ultra nationalist independence-now movement banned from the French Cameroons for causing widespread disturbances, fled to the Southern British Cameroons and set up their headquarters in Kumba. One of the main items in their program, re-unification of the two Cameroons, found a ready supporter in J. N. Foncha, who seceded from the parent Kamerun National Congress to set up his own party, the Kamerun National Democratic Party. Foncha preached complete secession from Nigeria, a step from which Endeley had recoiled, for all his separatism. Foncha further advocated an early reunification of the two Cameroons.

The political extremism of the UPC exiles and the continued UPC-inspired terrorism on the French side of the border finally alienated the KNDP, and Foncha and his colleagues shed few tears when the UPC leaders finally were deported from the British Cameroons in 1957. Although physically gone, the UPC left "unification" behind as the rallying cry of the KNDP. In the meantime, Dr. Endeley, whose KNC formed the first African-led government in the British Cameroons under constitutional reforms introduced in 1958, began to change his position. By 1959, Endeley had turned *volte face* and now advocated integration with Nigeria after it became independent. This change of heart cost him his government; in January 1959, Foncha and the KNDP swept into office on an anti-Nigerian pro-unification wave.

In April 1959, the special "Cameroons Session" of the UN suggested a plebiscite be held in the Cameroons to give the territory a chance to decide its political future. The two leaders were told to go home and agree on the questions to be asked. Foncha and Endeley found they could not agree on the date of the plebiscite, much less on the questions, and finally threw the issue back into

the UN's lap. In September 1959, both leaders found themselves back in New York, this time under pressure to decide on something even if it meant pleasing neither side.

Foncha had meanwhile sensed a change in popular opinion at home and departed for the UN with the odd promise—for this stage of African history—that he would return with an extension of the trusteeship until at least 1962.

He did not get this promised extension, and was pressured instead into accepting an early plebiscite by a powerful phalanx composed of Endeley and the delegates of Guinea, Ghana, and other African states. Mr. Foncha's ministerial colleagues were less than elated with this turn of events, and it was only with difficulty that he held on to his slim parliamentary majority. Prior to his departure, the KNDP had 13 seats in the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly to the KNC's 12. It was not long until one of the KNDP members defected to the opposition, and the government only managed to retain its majority by the expedient of appointing a woman to represent the female electorate.

A Pox on Both Houses?

Foncha had correctly sensed the development, in 1959 and 1960, of the widespread feeling in the Cameroons that neither integration or unification presented altogether satisfactory alternatives. Paradoxically, both major parties had helped the growth of this new negativism.

The KNC—now renamed the Cameroonian National People's Convention (CNPC)—favors integration with Nigeria, pointing with horror and dismay at the continued violence and disorder over the eastern border in what is now the Cameroun Republic. Dr. Endeley also maintains, with an ear tuned to the old separatism, that integration offers the Southern Cameroonian a greater chance for local autonomy (as a region in the Nigerian Federation) than does a unified Cameroun, in which the British sector would be swallowed up by its eastern neighbor.

Furthermore, the electorate has been reminded of its traditional economic and administrative ties to Nigeria, as well as of the social dislocations that might follow unification. Dr. Endeley's list of unpleasanties includes such items as a change in language, a different sort of schooling, different money and weight systems, driving on the other side of the street, and the like.

The KNDP, on the other hand, has played on the widespread anti-Ibo feeling in the south, and stressed old ethnic ties with the people of French Cameroun. A joint Cameroun-Southern Cameroons government declaration announced in October 1960 promised a federation of the two entities should the vote favor unification. An unusual feature of this declaration,



Southern Cameroons Prime Minister J. N. Foncha (right) with Cameroun Prime Minister Charles Assale (left).

—Le Vine

signed by Prime Minister Foncha, Cameroun Prime Minister Assale, and Cameroun President Ahmadou Ahidjo, was a promise that the future federation would belong neither to the Commonwealth nor the French Community.

Thus both sides have stated their case so strongly that they have greatly complicated the problem which the voters must resolve in February. The fear of being "swallowed up" by one or other of two powerful neighbors acts as a repellent for many people. Mr. Foncha accurately reflected the hopes of many of his constituents who saw in continued trusteeship a way of deferring the ultimate decision until it could be taken on firmer grounds.

Since his opposition prevailed against him in New York in November 1959, Foncha has been working to give unification a new popularity in the Southern Cameroons. But the ability of either major political leader to rally voters to his standard will depend, in all probability, on the force of the intangible social, ethnic, and economic factors which still constitute the main touchstones of politics in the Southern Cameroons electorate rather than the logic of either position. After all, there is still a third alternative, even though it will not be found on the plebiscite ballots—that of continued trusteeship. For a new party, the United Kamerun Party, has been recently urging voters to tear their ballots in half, or to abstain from voting. By provoking a close vote, or by cutting any majority to a mere plurality, the UKP might force the United Nations to reconsider its responsibilities to the territory.

Adding to this uncertainty is the publicly-optimistic, privately-pessimistic attitude of responsible Niger-

(Continued on page 12)

Mali Faces the Facts of Life

FOR many weeks now, diplomats of East and West have been sitting in Bamako's Grand Hotel, eyeing each other warily. None has a definite plan and most admit in private that their chief function at this stage is to reconnoiter and make sure the "other side" doesn't get in too securely. As for the Mali Government, largely ensconced on Koluba Hill, from where the French used to rule, it has a sincere and desperate determination to cooperate with everyone and a nagging doubt that the help of all put together, East and West, would be enough to put Mali securely on her feet.

The first fully-fledged Embassy, apart from the French, was the West German. They are after strictly commercial agreements, in particular a contract for the supply of Mercedes Benz trucks, since road transport is the crying need of this newly-landlocked economy. They have been approached about the possibility of building slaughter-houses with a view to establishing a meat export trade, but no one knows whether the cattle will still be worth slaughtering after marching the long miles to the proposed slaughter-houses. The Czechs have actually signed an agreement which includes, in addition to technical aid, the possible erection of textile and oil factories, but no detailed plans have been drawn up. The Americans, who are making an earnest and energetic effort to stop Mali going the way of Guinea, have also signed a tentative aid agreement, but they are bent on a massive psychological offensive rather than trying to get Congress to pass economy expenditures. The same goes for the British and also the Israelis: the former have invited President Modibo Keita to London in the New Year and the latter are generous with scholarships for students of all kinds, from medicine to rural economy. There are also Russians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Chinese and Vietnamese exploratory missions. But Dr. Nkrumah's delegation, which arrived the last week in November, may be the most important of all.

Politics Severs Railway

Mali's immediate problem is that politics have severed the railway line between Bamako and Dakar—through which 100,000 tons a year of groundnuts, kola nuts, and rice were exported. The eventual aim is that Conakry, which is 400 km. nearer than Dakar, should be the main outlet. But for the moment the Conakry-Kankan railway is in a poor state and trade in this direction awaits the completion of Soviet plans to rebuild the railway, with a projected exten-

sion to Bamako. In the meantime, the whole of Mali's export and import trade is carried on through Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, by road. A Mali road cooperative has been formed and will operate on a big scale as soon as it has the trucks, but in the meantime French transport companies grow rich on the trade. Naturally, prices have gone up—particularly cement, which has more than doubled in price since Mali's rupture with Senegal.



The government claims loudly that it can do without Senegal; indeed, up on the hill, at the *Ministère de l'Economie Rurale et du Plan*, they are saying that alternative outlets were in any case badly needed to break the unnatural Dakar monopoly. But for the moment, until a number of costly and ambitious road and rail plans are completed, it is a clear case of cutting off the nose to spite the face. Nor is there any quick prospect of the railways reopening; at the Information Ministry they say it is only "sentimental reasons" that have compelled the closure, and these will pass; but both at the Ministry of the Plan and the Presidency they shake their heads with finality, dooming Dakar to perpetual oblivion. The conviction remains unshaken that a Franco-Senegalese plot caused the rupture and that Senegal is now no better than a neo-colony.

However, it is still France, and for the present France alone, which pays the bills. This year's French contribution, in technical, military and administrative aid to Mali totals some 3,000m. francs C.F.A. (nearly \$12,000,000). Mali's balance of payments deficit is currently 9,000m. (\$36,000,000) and her budget is under 7,000m. (\$28,000,000). Although since the break-up of the Federation, French technical aid has had no legal basis, it is continuing nonetheless. Until the end of this fiscal year at any rate, France pays the salaries of the Mali army and gendarmerie.

She maintains air bases at Bamako, Gao, and Thessalit. French ground forces, though very much diminished, still have one base at Kati, near Bamako. There are about 500 French civil servants still at work in the country. They include 100 at the *Office du Niger*, the big rice and cotton scheme up-country, 350 technical assistance personnel, and a number under contract to Mali (one of these is a former Upper Volta Minister of Agriculture who is now the brains behind the Planning Ministry).

Much of the export, import, and retail trade remains in such private hands as the *Compagnie du Niger Francaise*, the local associate of the United Africa Company, which had a difficult time in the first days of the regime, when home transfers of funds were forbidden. They are now allowed to operate on a system of repatriating a fixed percentage of turnover and they expect to continue to have their sector of the economy, despite predicted encroachments from the newly formed *Societe Malienne d'Exportation et d'Importation*.

Flexibility Limited

Of course, French engineers also figure among the Czechs, Russians, Germans, etc., who tour the country looking for roads to build and bridges to put up, but, like the others, they are not able to begin projects until money for them has been definitely granted from home.

Some people were inclined to expect a decisive Eastward or Westward turn after the January Cabinet reshuffle but it is doubtful if Mali will take any spectacular steps of that kind. (See *News Review*, page 10). She is not promising enough economically for the Russians to want to turn her into another Guinea, and the West, on this understanding, is content to remain on the sidelines. Modibo Keita claims to be in a mood to put progress at home before foreign adventure of any kind. With those of Guinea and Ghana, his *Union Democratique Soudanaise* party is among the best organized in Africa and such occasions as the recent reception of Dr. Nkrumah showed an impressive spirit of enthusiasm; it is a boy-scout rather than a totalitarian spirit. There will undoubtedly be technical and economic progress in Mali, but it will be slow. She has no trump cards under the ground such as aluminum, gold, oil, or iron-ore and geographically she is ill-placed even to make profitable use of her groundnuts, cotton, rice and cattle. Such facts of life cannot be overcome by politics.

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Patrice Lumumba: A Political Post-Mortem?

(Continued from page 4)

bal origins, but the anti-Belgian orientation acquired by these tribes in their attempts to resist the penetration and maintenance of Western rule also helped sensitize the members to the appeals of the MNC. The lack of identification between the Bakutshu and Batetela and their traditional chiefs also accounts for their responsive attitude towards modernist and national symbols.

Youth and Women Also Help

A third technique, used by other parties besides the MNC, was to build up functional organizations to extend, coordinate, and unify the political actions of the MNC. This organizational network embraced a variety of interest-groups, such as youth movements (*Jeunesses MNC*), women's associations, and trade unions. The latter category, represented by the *Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Congo* (UNTC)—affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions and the *Union Generale des Travailleurs d'Afrique Noire* (UGTAN) of Conakry—was controlled by Antoine Tshimanga, spokesman of the pro-Lumumba youth group, *Alliance de la Jeunesse Congolaise*, and Valentin Mutombo, First Secretary General of the UNTC. Despite these efforts, the linkage between organized labor and the MNC remained fragile. This was not only due to the fact that it was established at a relatively late date, but also because trade unions' activities had already been monopolized by two important syndicates, the *Union des Travailleurs Congolais* (UTC) and the *Federation Generale des Travailleurs du Kongo* (FGTK), respectively identified with Socialist and Christian Democratic tendencies.

As the election date approached, Lumumba sought to transform the MNC into an integrating structure within which both sectional and national interests would be represented. To a considerable extent, this purpose had already been accomplished through a number of tactical alliances with minor parties: in the Kasai, for example, the *Parti National Lulua-Freres*, the *Union Congolaise*, the *Mouvement Politique Kanioka*, the *Alliance des Basonge*, the *Coalition Kasaienne*, the *Union des Paysans Rurux Progressistes*, and others, had clearly committed themselves in favor of the MNC. It received its formal sanction, however, at the extraordinary congress of the MNC, held in Luluaubourg April 3-4, 1960—a major landmark in the history of the party.

From the substance of the resolutions adopted by the participants at Luluaubourg, it appeared that the intransigent opposition of the MNC leader to all forms of separatism had

undergone considerable dilution. While the need to transcend particularistic loyalties was still recognized, allowance was made for "a certain degree of autonomy for each of the six provinces insofar as matters of provincial interest are concerned." The congress also recognized that "the participation of customary authorities in the political institutions of the country (was) necessary in order to insure the social equilibrium and stability of the nascent Congolese state," though it also cautioned traditional authorities against the "corruption" and "delusions" to which they would expose themselves if they became the victims of the colonialist propaganda. Finally, the participants nevertheless admitted that "the presence of Europeans, once deprived of its oppressive aspects, will constitute a valuable factor of economic, technical, and scientific progress within the context of a free and independent Congo"—a move which was obviously intended to reconcile the objectives of the party with the economic demands of those Congolese who derived special advantages from the maintenance of Belgian enterprises.

Lumumba's New Troubles

As the Congo crossed the threshold of independence, however, the *rapport* which previously existed between the MNC leader and the party cadres underwent a radical transformation. The rapid alienation of party militants at both the provincial and national levels was primarily due to the collapse of the regime's most valuable instrument of stability, the *Force Publique*. In effect, the sheer number and complexity of the issues with which Premier Lumumba suddenly found himself confronted involved a range of demands on his energies which could only be satisfied at the expense of party activities.

As a result, some of the party cadres became disillusioned by the seemingly indifferent attitude of their leader towards the future of the party as an autonomous political unit. Among the rank and file of the party, those who had been vainly awaiting the jobs which they had been promised in the heyday of the nationalist crusade had already grown disenchanted. As they added their unhappy voice to the growing mass of unemployed workers, further unrest developed in urban areas.

The wholesale and somewhat abrupt africanization of the civil service also had major political ramifications. Aside from the fact that the number of posts to be filled could hardly be expected to meet the demand, the situation prevailing in the upper reaches of the civil service soon became one of institutionalized nepotism. A number of the Permanent Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Under Secre-

taries were appointed on the basis of merit, but this was exceptional rather than typical. In most instances, a Minister not only selected his *chef de cabinet* from among his friends or relatives within his own tribe, but his administrative staff as well. Party members denied these favors gradually grew bitter. Erratic promotions in the lower echelons of the administrative hierarchy also created jealousies. As a result of the uneven distribution of Congolese personnel in the various services under Belgian colonial rule, the rate of promotions in a given service inevitably depended on the number of aspirants in that service. A *commis chef*—one of the lowest grades in the Typing Class—might find himself catapulted overnight to a top position in one department, while a *redacteur principal* would only be granted a marginal advancement in another.

A final source of tension lay in the failure of deputies and provincial councillors to communicate with their constituents. The latter, who had vested high hopes in their elected officials, were bitterly disappointed by what they considered to be total indifference to their own desiderata. Thus, shortly after independence, the *president sectionnaire* of the Walikale branch of the MNC, in Kivu Province, wrote the Party Chairman deploring that the local representative, elected on an MNC ticket, "never visited the people of Walikale to inquire about their needs and grievances" and further noted that "the whole population of Walikale laments that it never had

(Continued on page 12)

Entente Countries Revise Institutions

(Continued from page 2)

temporary arrangement the election of the president by the legislature. Diori's government is composed of 12 ministers and one secretary of state, all members of the Niger Progressive Party.

The December 11 election in Dahomey, following the adoption of the Constitution on November 25, confirmed in power Hubert Maga and his Dahomey United Party (PDU). The country has a 60-deputy Assembly, plus the only vice-president in the *Entente*. A confusing political history lies behind recent events in Dahomey, though Maga has been Prime Minister since May 1959. He was originally the leader of the Dahomey Democratic Rally, which merged on November 15, 1960 with the Dahomey National Party to form PDU. The Dahomey National Party, in turn, was the product of a March 1960 fusion of the Republican Party of Dahomey and the Progressive Party.

ECONOMIC NOTES

Sudan Notes Dramatic Change In Its Balance of Payments

Figures recently released by the Sudanese Government indicate that the serious economic crisis which plagued the Sudan in 1957 and 1958 has been dramatically reversed. The 1957-58 deficit of £S34,400,000 (\$98,728,000) in the country's balance of international payments has now been wiped out, and the surplus for 1959 and the first eight months of 1960 stands at £S17,600,000 (\$50,512,000).

British Industrial Group Examines Nigeria's Prospects

A group of leading British industrialists spent the last half of January in Nigeria examining the industrial structure of the country and advising on investment and development in the newly-independent republic. The group, a delegation of the Federation of British Industries (FBI), comprised officials at the level of director, managing director, overseas director, and chairman from such firms as Joseph Lucas (Industries) Ltd., English Sewing Cotton Co. Ltd., Scottish Cables Ltd., Lanarkshire Steel Co. Ltd., Imperial Chemical Industries, Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd., United Africa Co., Cadbury Brothers Ltd., Barclays Bank D.C.O., and Richard Costain Ltd.

The delegation split into groups to travel to the separate regions, and then returned to Lagos to take part in the Nigerian Industrial Development Conference in late January.

Angola Announces Plans To Modernize Fish Industry

The Angola Government has announced plans to modernize existing fish-processing plants and to construct new ones as part of its reorganization of the country's fishing industry around a limited number of large cooperatives. In 1957, dried and canned fish accounted for 3.1 percent of Angola's exports, and fish meal for feeding to cattle accounted for 11.5 percent of total exports, compared to a 1956 share of 2.5 percent.

Oil Refineries to be Built In Ghana and Nigeria

West Africa will have two new oil refineries within the next few years as the result of agreements reached in November and December to build at Tema in Ghana and Port Harcourt in Nigeria.

The Port Harcourt refinery will be built and operated by subsidiaries of Shell and the British Petroleum

Company with the two companies participating on the same equal share formula they followed in the exploration for oil in Nigeria. The refinery will cost an estimated £12,000,000 to build, will have about 1,000,000 tons capacity, and will be completed in three or four years. It will prepare Nigerian crude oil for the Nigerian market.

The Ghana refinery will be built at the new port of Tema by an Italian government controlled company. It will be operated by a joint Ghanaian-Italian company, will cost an estimated £8,500,000 to build, will have an initial capacity of 1,200,000 metric tons, and will be completed in two years.

Tanganyika Invites Competition In Diamond Prospecting

Tanganyika has terminated the diamond-prospecting monopoly of Williamson Diamonds, Ltd., effective January 1, 1961, and opened the country for exploration to other reputable mining companies as well. The legislation which terminated the monopoly provides for the division of the country into 24 blocks of about 1500 square miles each, to be available for exclusive prospecting rights for diamonds only. Williamson's will be given first option on four of these blocks. Other mining companies may also apply for more than one block each, but must agree to spend at least £30,000 a year on each block. Williamson is owned jointly by DeBeers Consolidated Mines and the Tanganyika Government.

Inter-African Coffee Group Would Stabilize Robusta Price

African coffee producers met December 6 in Tananarive, capital of the Malgache Republic, to create an Inter-African Coffee Organization to seek means of stabilizing the world market price of robusta coffee. The organization grew out of a September 1960 producers' meeting in Paris called by the Ivory Coast, and later discussions in Mexico and Washington. Although African coffee-exporting countries are members of the International Coffee Agreement, which attempts to stabilize world coffee prices by assigning export quotas to each country to limit supply on the world market, the price of robusta, Africa's main coffee export, has continued to decline. The new African organization is considering minimum prices for exported coffee on the grounds that this would be a more effective price stabilizer for African robusta than export quotas. The organization will also make it possible



A coffee plantation near Moshi in Tanganyika.

—United Nations Photo

for the African coffee-producing countries to act as a group in the International Coffee Agreement.

The Inter-African Coffee Organization will have a secretariat in Paris, and will hold its next session in Uganda at the end of 1961. Charter members are Cameroun, the Central African Republic, both Congo Republics, Ivory Coast, the Malgache Republic, Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Portugal.

Algeria-Chad Truck Route Now Seen as Possibility

The feasibility of a commercial truck route across the Sahara from Algeria to Fort Lamy, the capital of Chad, has now been established, according to the *Africa Economic Newsletter*, published in Johannesburg. As a result of an earlier scientific expedition and a recent crossing by commercial trucks, a French truck-manufacturing firm, *Bertiet*, has reportedly concluded that a freight saving of £150 per truckload could be made by shipping goods by this route. Imports to the Chad Republic have heretofore come by sea to Pointe Noire in the Congo Republic (formerly Moyen-Congo) and then been transhipped by rail to Brazzaville, by river to Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, and from there by truck to Fort Lamy over roads which are impassable in the wet season. (See "Transportation: Key to Progress," page 8, *Africa Report*, March 1960).

Norman W. Mosher

News Review

Another Inconclusive Month in the Congo . . .

(Chronology of major January developments)

January 1: Colonel Mobutu's troops enter Lumumba-affiliated areas of Kivu Province via Belgian administered Ruanda-Urundi.

January 4: The *New York Times* reports that 40,000 of the 60,000 to 70,000 non-UN foreigners now living in Congo are Belgians. . . . UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld arrives in Leopoldville to study Congolese crisis.

January 7: The heads of state of Morocco, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, and the United Arab Republic, meeting in Casablanca, call for the release of Patrice Lumumba and his restoration to the premiership and demand that the United Nations disarm the "lawless bands" of Colonel Joseph Mobutu.

January 9: A reported 1500 troops from Kivu and Orientale Provinces loyal to imprisoned Patrice Lumumba penetrate into north Katanga, apparently welcomed by local Baluba tribesmen.

January 10: Moise Tshombe, president of secessionist Katanga Province, threatens military action against "armed invaders" of the northern part of his province unless UN troops evict them.

January 11: The United Nations command moves reinforcements into Katanga to prevent an "acute danger of civil war."

January 13: False rumors spread in Leopoldville that Patrice Lumumba has been freed from imprisonment in the course of a brief mutiny by troops guarding him at Thysville, the garrison town where he is held.

January 14: The *London Observer* characterizes Mr. Hammarskjöld's mood upon his return to New York from the Congo as one of "optimistic despair." Concluded *Observer* correspondent Philip Deane: "He foresees a prolongation of political chaos, the return of an abidingly impossible Mr. Lumumba to office, and, perhaps, the eventual mutual exhaustion of Congolese politicians until they more or less have to lean on one another." . . . President Kasavubu demands the recall of UN representative Rajeshwar Dayal of India.

January 16: Secretary General Hammarskjöld turns down President Kasavubu's demand that Rajeshwar Dayal be released as head of the UN mission in the Congo.

January 17: Agreement is reportedly reached between President Kasavubu and Katanga's Moise Tshombe on a proposed roundtable conference of Congolese politicians sometime in February. . . . The Kasavubu government transfers Patrice Lumumba from Thysville to Buluo Penitentiary

near Jadotville, Katanga. There are conflicting reports about physical maltreatment of Mr. Lumumba en route. . . . The government of Katanga province announces it has carried out "massive arrests" following the discovery of a plot to assassinate President Tshombe and his Cabinet.

January 20: In Lagos, the Nigerian Defense Ministry confirms that there have been isolated cases of indiscipline among Nigerian troops serving in the Congo. Firm disciplinary action has been taken. . . . Mr. Dayal, chief UN representative, sends strong protest to pro-Lumumba forces controlling Orientale province regarding the reported arrest of 12 Belgians in retaliation for mistreatment of Lumumba.

January 21: Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko says Lumumba will be brought to trial as soon as judges can be found to try him.

January 23: Joseph Mobutu, military "strongman" of the Kasavubu government, is promoted to Major General and named Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese Army. . . . The UN announces that the United Arab Republic has formally requested that its 519 troops be sent home before February 1. . . . The 11-member Afro-Asian UN Conciliation Commission for the Congo, headed by Nigeria's Jaja Wachuku, leaves Elizabethville after failing in its efforts to interview imprisoned Patrice Lumumba.

January 24: UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld says a stable political settlement in the Congo is impossible without the participation of deposed Premier Patrice Lumumba in the negotiations. . . . President Kasavubu asks the Security Council to investigate "flagrant interference" of an unspecified nature by the UAR in Congolese internal affairs.

January 25: President Kasavubu opens preliminary steering meeting of the long-awaited roundtable political conference in Leopoldville, now set for mid-February. 100 delegates and 300 observers attend, but the Lumumba strongholds of Orientale and Kivu provinces are not represented.

January 27: Seven nations—Ceylon, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia—petition the Security Council to take up "alarming recent developments" in the Congo.

February 1: UN Security Council convenes to discuss the Congo. Secretary General Hammarskjöld asks for authority to disarm troops backing all sides in the Congo power struggle, warning that the alternative is to let civil war "tear the country to pieces."

Ghana, Guinea, Mali Confer on Union

Representatives of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali began talks in Accra the second week in January aimed at implementation of the "political union" of the three countries announced in Conakry on December 24. The committee which convened in Accra is one of two ministerial-level working groups appointed at Conakry to draw up arrangements for "harmonizing" the economic and financial policies of the three states. It was to give priority attention to the creation of a common currency and a common bank.

African Women Discuss Political and Social Role

Two major conferences in Africa in recent weeks dealt with the role of women in the emerging continent:

- A two-week seminar organized by the United Nations in Addis Ababa from December 9-23 was attended by some 100 women leaders from 31 African countries and territories. The delegates discussed the educational, economic, political, social, and legal obstacles still impeding the progress of women in Africa and recommended the holding of seminars in individual countries to follow up the work begun in Addis Ababa.

- Some 300 women from 50 independent countries and colonial territories convened in Cairo on January 15 for the first Afro-Asian Women's Conference, organized by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. Four of the five main topics up for discussion dealt with women's rights, but it was the fifth—"the role of women in the struggle for national independence and the maintenance of peace"—that dominated this politically-inspired meeting.

Mali Radicals Checked By President Keita?

Intense bargaining among competing factions in the governing *Union Soudanaise* party of Mali this month has resulted in an unexpected stabilization of President Modibo Keita's position vis-a-vis more radical elements.

On January 20, President Keita stole the radicals' thunder (or, conversely, succumbed to radical pressure) by publicly requesting the "rapid" evacuation of all French troops and military bases from Mali soil. Following up this tactical advantage swiftly, the Mali president announced on January 21 a cabinet reshuffle which transferred the Ministry of Defense and Security from the radical faction to his own hands. The Defense Ministry—which must implement the decision to get French forces out of Mali—was previously held by Madeira Keita, chief spokes-

News Review

man for Mali's more militantly anti-western faction. The latter Mr. Keita—no kin of the President—retains the Ministry of Interior and also becomes Minister of Information under the new distribution of power in Mali's "collective leadership", but the consensus among close observers of Mali politics is that Madeira Keita's threat to power has been checked, at least temporarily. The new Cabinet was approved by the National Assembly in a unanimous vote.

Afro-Shirazi Party Wins in Zanzibar

The moderate Afro-Shirazi Party, a coalition of Africans and Shirazi Moslems, became the largest single party in the Legislative Council (i.e. 10 of the 22 elected positions) in Zanzibar general elections held January 17. Nine seats went to the Arab-dominated Nationalist Party and three to the all-African Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party; under recent constitutional reforms, eight other seats in the 30-member council will be filled by British appointees.

The Nationalist Party, led by Ali Muhsin Ali, has called for a recount in one urban constituency in Pemba, however, where the Afro-Shirazis apparently won the seat by a single vote—1,538 against the Nationalists' 1,537. If the Afro-Shirazi majority holds up, it is anticipated that the party's leader, Abeid Karume, will be asked to form a government.

Leniency Announced For Ethiopian Rebels

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia issued a full pardon on January 12 to those soldiers of his Imperial Bodyguard who took part in the abortive revolt against his regime in December. All soldiers in the guard of good health and within the age limit can reenter the Army, and their wives or closest relatives may collect December pay. Sergeants and corporals must reenter as private soldiers, but will be restored to their previous rank with good conduct. Officers of the bodyguard who took part in the revolt will leave the service and stand trial; non-participating officers must also leave the guard, but with three months full pay.

East African Federation Endorsed by PAFMECA

African political leaders from East and Central Africa agreed at a conference of the Pan African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa in Nairobi during the second week in January to work toward the creation of an East African Federation of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, and Zanzibar, and possibly including territories of the central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Among the delegates to the con-

ference were Julius Nyerere, Chief Minister of Tanganyika, Tom Mboya of the Kenya African National Union, Joseph Kiwanuka of Uganda, Kenneth Kaunda of the Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party, and Joshua Nkomo of Southern Rhodesia's National Democratic Party.

Constitutional Reforms Set For Bechuanaland

The Commonwealth Relations Office in London announced this month that major constitutional reforms will be introduced in Britain's Bechuanaland Protectorate by mid-1961.

Under the new constitution, the Legislative Council will have an elected unofficial majority comprised of equal numbers of Africans and Europeans, and one Asian. General elections are tentatively scheduled for May.

At present, Bechuanaland is administered by a Resident Commissioner who functions under the direction of a High Commissioner responsible for Britain's three remaining territories in southern Africa—Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland.

Rwanda Republic Poses New Problems for UN

Rwanda, the northern half of Belgium's central African trust territory of Rwanda-Urundi, unexpectedly jumped the gun on planned constitutional developments this month, proclaiming the establishment of a "sovereign republic" on January 30.

This action raised new problems for the United Nations, since it is the first time that a Trust Territory has declared its own independence. Rwanda's action is in direct contravention of a recommendation that the entire territory (Rwanda-Burundi) hold elections on March 7 under UN supervision to decide the future structure of the two kingdoms. Agreement on the proposed election was reached in roundtable discussions held in Ostend, Belgium early in January by representatives of Belgium and the main political groupings of the territories.

Rwanda's 2,000,000 people are divided among three caste groupings—the Batwa, Bahutu, and Batutsi. The Batwa, who are pygmies, comprise one percent of Rwanda and were the original rulers of this land. Eighty five percent of the people of Rwanda are Bahutu, who suppressed the Batwa and for five centuries were, in turn, suppressed by the Batutsi. The Batutsi, comprising 14 percent of the population, reigned over the Bahutu and the Batwa until Belgian policy changed in favor of the Bahutu majority in the past five years.

The "revolution" which overthrew the Batutsi Mwami (or king) of Rwanda was spearheaded by two parties dominated by the majority Bahutu tribe—the *Aprosoma* (the As-

sociation for the Promotion of the Masses), and the *Parmehutu* (the Party of Bahutu Emancipation). Their assumption of power was the culmination of a series of events which included the Manifesto of the Hutu in 1957, the Batutsi-Bahutu riots in November 1959, and July 1960 local elections in which the two Bahutu parties presented a common front and swept 84 percent of the votes cast.

The president of the new Rwanda republic is a *Parmehutu* leader, Dominique Mbonyemutwa; the premier is Gregoire Kayibanda, the founder of the revolutionary newspaper of the Bahutu. The 45-man provisional legislative assembly has been converted into an official body by an impromptu congress of 3,120 local officials in Rwanda. The government will, at this time, exclude the Batutsi, who have boycotted the sessions.

Rwanda—with the highest population density of any country in Tropical Africa, no significant mineral resources, erratic rainfall, and one shaky commercial crop (coffee)—faces a difficult economic as well as political future.

Barotse Paramount Chief Talks of Secession

There were new rumors this month that Barotseland—the vast "Protectorate-within-a Protectorate" situated just east of Angola on the upper Zambezi River—may try to secede from Northern Rhodesia if the British Government endorses constitutional reforms giving Africans a majority in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.

Sir Mwanawina Lewanika, the Paramount Chief of Barotseland, reportedly informed Britain in 1960 of his desire to break away from Northern Rhodesia if political developments there should threaten the traditional tribal autonomy of Barotseland. Meanwhile, a new organization, the Barotse Anti-Secession Movement, has also been formed in the territory with support of the Northern Rhodesian United National Independence Party.

Negotiations Resume In Southern Rhodesia

The Southern Rhodesian constitutional talks, which were begun in London just before Christmas, were resumed in Salisbury on January 16. At this preliminary stage they are under the chairmanship of Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, and the objective is to deal first with amendments and changes about which there is little disagreement among the participating representatives. The conference will thus be able to get down to the real issues when Duncan Sandys, the Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, flies to Southern Rhodesia early in February to take the chair.

The "Other Cameroons": A Reluctant Bride?

(Continued from page 6)

ian and Camerounian politicians. Publicly, they favor integration or unification, depending on whether they speak from a Lagos or Yaounde rostrum. Privately, they admit that anyone who gets the Southern Cameroons acquires an economic and financial liability, and almost come to wishing it on someone else.

For all these reasons, not even the most sanguine of observers will hazard a guess as to which way the Southern Cameroons will go.

The Plebiscite in the North

The Northern Cameroons presents another set of problems, almost wholly unrelated to those in the south. The February plebiscite will be the second plebiscitary experience for the north within two years. In November 1959, a UN plebiscite was held to determine whether the Northern Cameroons wished to join Northern Nigeria after October 1, 1960, or whether a decision should be postponed. Much to everyone's surprise, the region did not vote for union with Nigeria, but rather to remain under trusteeship and put off a final decision.

One reason the 1959 plebiscite results came as such a surprise was that the UN Visiting Mission, which surveyed the Cameroons in 1958-59, had made the error of talking only with the dominant Moslem Fulani populations, whose ties are with their Nigerian brethren. On the basis of these interviews, the UN Mission came away with the impression that union with Nigeria was almost inevitable. The members apparently failed to consult the ethnically submergued but numerically superior animist peoples of the hill regions. These people harbor a long-standing grievance against the Fulani, their traditional overlords, who early in the nineteenth century converted some by the sword and chased most of the others into the Mandara, Atlantika, and Mambilla highlands.

The pre-plebiscite campaign involved all the major Nigerian political parties except the NCNC. The Northern Peoples' Congress campaigned in favor of integration; the others, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (allied to NCNC), the United Middle Belt Congress/Action Group alliance, and the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party, campaigned for the second alternative. The final vote was 70,546 for deferring a decision and 42,788 for integration with Northern Nigeria.

The NKDP (Northern Kamerun Democratic Party), a newcomer to the scene, advocated a separate Northern Cameroon Region, a federal north-south Cameroons arrangement, and eventual reunification of the former German Kamerun. The NKDP has become more active in the current

pre-plebiscite campaigns, and tenuous links with both the KNDP and the Cameroun's *Union Camerounaise* Party are apparent. To no one's surprise and to the NPC's irritation, the parties favoring the second alternative campaigned vigorously among the "Kirdi" (animist) population and succeeded in translating the alternatives into pro-Fulani, anti-Fulani terms. Especially active in this respect was the Northern Kamerun Democratic Party, which pushed a vigorous anti-Fulani campaign among the Kirdi tribes inhabiting the inaccessible Mambilla plateau.

There was little, if any, understanding of the broader issues of the plebiscite; local discontent and ethnic tensions were the dominant determinants of the 1959 vote.

Scattered reports from the Northern Cameroons indicate that something of a repeat performance may be in the offing, at least with respect to the sort of campaign waged. This time, however, according to official British sources, the local reforms instituted last year in the area may turn the vote in favor of integration with Nigeria by a margin of about six to four. Once again the Nigerian parties are active on the scene, this time campaigning for integration. Pro-unification parties are the NKDP, now grown stronger and bolder, and a minor group calling itself the Kamerun Freedom Party.

Four, Not Two Alternatives

Thus, in the final analysis, the two simple alternatives posed by the United Nations may turn out to be four, none of them wholly satisfactory. The following are the possibilities which lie ahead:

1. Both Northern and Southern Cameroons may vote for integration with Nigeria. This choice would probably involve the least disruption in the administrative and economic organization of the Cameroons.

2. Both Northern and Southern Cameroons may opt for unification with the Cameroun Republic. If the Ahidjo-Assale-Foncha communique of October 1960 is to be believed, the Southern Cameroons would become part of a federal arrangement. According to a Cameroun Republic communique dated December 31, 1960, the northern Cameroons, if it should choose unification, would apparently have a choice among status as a region in the Republic, being split into several departments, or becoming the third part of a proposed Cameroons federation.

3. The two parts of the Trust Territory may opt for different attachments.

4. The vote may turn out to be indecisive. Should the margin of votes between one alternative or the other be too close, or should a vote either way comprise only a minority

of the total electorate (a large abstention percentage would make any majority into a mere plurality), the United Nations might be forced to reconsider its responsibilities in the area. The possibility of continued trusteeship holds attractions for many people both in the north and south. In this case, the reaction of Nigeria and the Cameroun Republic as well as the response of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN—which decisively influenced both the scheduling of the plebiscite and the choice of alternatives—would be crucial.

Patrice Lumumba: A Political Post-Mortem?

(Continued from page 8)

a chance to meet its provincial councillors."

The defections which the party suffered had to be counteracted by the enlistment of a fresh and dynamic group of supporters, dedicated to the cause of the regime. Hence the renewed efforts displayed by Lumumba after July to appeal to the "Congolese people" as a whole, irrespective of their loyalties to particular tribes or parties. Official communications of this period reveal two major types of propaganda. The preferred one consisted of holding the Belgian colonialists responsible for all the shortcomings which had thus far compromised the stability of the regime. The record aimed at the promotion of a distinct type of civic virtue, characterized by a mixture of patriotism and acquiescence to the "powers that be."

These exhortations proved to be of little avail in bolstering Lumumba's position. They came to be viewed with increasing skepticism and, in some quarters, with a good deal of distaste. These views were shared, if not expressed, by some political elements directly participating in the Lumumba government.

Lumumba's Comeback

Lumumba's mystique—which was thus wearing thin by the time Colonel Mobutu seized the political initiative from the feuding Premier and President Kasavubu in September and set up his independent College of Commissioners—has been reinforced by the treatment suffered by the MNC leader at the hands of Mobutu's troops.

The reversal of the Lumumba tide occurring now is partly a symptom of the cohesive forces at work among militant nationalists. But it also suggests that the complex of attitudes and ideals of which Lumumba is both the advocate and the symbol is far more deeply engrained among the Congolese masses than his detractors believed. In this writer's view, the prospect of any real political stabilization will remain dangerously distant as long as Lumumba, or at least the brand of nationalism which he symbolizes, is not reckoned with.

Paternalism Mars Major African Study

By HARVEY GLICKMAN
Book Editor

Tropical Africa, by George H. T. Kimble (N.Y.: *Twentieth Century Fund*, 1960), volume I, "Land and Livelihood," 603 pages, volume II, "Society and Polity," 506 pages, \$15 set.

Over seven years ago, the Twentieth Century Fund commissioned Professor George Kimble, then the distinguished Director of the American Geographical Society, to organize a careful, non-technical study of tropical Africa—the area south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo—in all its myriad aspects and phases. Two hefty volumes embodying these results are now with us—a handbook of breadth and perspicacity that will be read, as well as referred to.

Although it encompasses and digests the contributions of 46 experts, *Tropical Africa* is no catalog of viewpoints and statistics. Professor Kimble wears his scholarship lightly and writes an engaging, communicable prose that vivifies even soil types and trade balances. For all its readability, *Tropical Africa* is a serious, exhaustive study, which will undoubtedly be "standard" for general readers for many years to come. Scholars, however, must still repair elsewhere for truly encyclopedic coverage and impartial analysis. If 24 experts descended on the 24 chapters—each to his own—no doubt two more volumes of "shortcomings" would be compiled.

Our own dissent concerns not his findings, but his tone and attitude, which are avuncular and patronizing. His moralistic approach to the resolution of social problems and over-use of metaphors and familiar homilies may endear Kimble to the "general" reader, but they will infuriate Africans and dismay serious students.

Volumes Differ in Tone

The first volume examines the physical conditions of Africa—its resources and its economy. Professor Kimble would seem to thread more easily and surely among materials closer to his scholarly calling, for his patronage is somewhat less evident here than in the second volume, which treats Africa's social conditions in a strangely uncontemporary manner, missing the turbulence and wide-eyed visions of the African present. Although this volume is impressive in its discussion of the techniques for fostering all forms of social development, the viewpoint has a distinct colonial tone.

The paternalistic attitude shows most clearly in the author's discussion of government. In both the Belgian and Portuguese systems Kimble finds much to praise and to ignore, sometimes flying in the face of expert

evidence. He seems largely to accept official claims of non-discrimination between Africans and whites, e.g., in farming settlements or in schooling. Although his treatment of British practice is more precise, he barely touches on the fundamental problems of plural societies and appears to accept at face-value European schemes to create multi-racial states.

Rather revealing are Kimble's scattered remarks about the "instincts" of "Africans" (although he takes great pains to delineate the enormous variety of social and physical life in Africa), his doubts about the "ability" of "the African," and his imputation of ethical failures as explanations of, e.g., theft or Mau Mau or status striving. For him, there exists a "true elite" who care not for worldly goods and from whom sprang the truly great, "an Aggrey . . . a Waruhiu . . . and a Prester John."



The basis for this attitude can be discovered in the chapters on traditional society and its change. Kimble accepts "the Stone Age to Machine Age" argument: Africans were backward, the West brought civilization. He scarcely mentions the vast, organized kingdoms of medieval West Africa and indeed states flatly that "there were no towns in tropical Africa before the present century." (1) Throughout, there is the detectable image of a congeries of immature cultures facing the pressure of mature civilization. Occasionally he implies that the ways of children help explain consumer choices or wage incentives among Africans. Professor Kimble does not seem comfortable at all in "the new Africa."

While this paternalistic bias is a serious difficulty, it does not, of course, negate Kimble's enormous achievement. His emphasis on the pervasive attraction of tradition in Africa and the consequent concentration on rural problems is certainly welcome and does much to keep problems of development in perspective. His descriptions of the problems of the land, of mining, and of manufacturing are masterful and will greatly help those who wish to help Africa. The outstanding characteristic of life in Africa is the incredible

arduousness of it. A hostile climate, inhospitable soil, diseases, and threatened overpopulation conspire to squeeze Africa's available choices into a very narrow compass. For clarifying and dramatizing this fact, as for providing a valuable reference work, we will remain long indebted to Professor Kimble and to the Twentieth Century Fund.

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Gezira, A Story of Development in the Sudan, by Arthur Gaitskell (London: *Faber*, 1959), 372 pages, 42s.

The Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian Relations: A Case Study in Power Politics, 1800-1956, by L. A. Fabunmi (London: *Longmans Green*, 1960), 486 pages, 50s.

Arthur Gaitskell, the brother of the leader of the British Labour Party, for 29 years associated with the Gezira cotton growing scheme and first Chairman and Managing Director of the Sudan Gezira Board, is probably the person most eminently qualified to explain its extraordinary success.

Located in a great plain at the confluence of the Blue and White Nile and covering a million acres of a 5,000,000 acre area that is called "Gezira," the scheme entails irrigating parched lands, on which peasant owners and tenants are helped to grow long staple cotton, the mainstay of the Sudan's economy. (Recently the World Bank advanced \$15,000,000 to increase cultivated acreage to nearly double the present size and thus nearly double the present crop.)

Mr. Gaitskell tells the story of the scheme's expansion chronologically, interspersing sections on technical problems. The first abortive step was taken by an American entrepreneur named Leigh Hunt, who secured a huge tract in 1904 and planned to bring in trained American Negroes to supervise agricultural development. One boat load actually arrived. Nineteen years later, under British aegis and with Egyptian Government capital, a triple partnership of company, colonial administration and tenants was established and the Gezira Scheme formally launched. He credits success to an advantageous climate and concentration of resources, to steady external demand, to the "merchant-adventurer" spirit of private capital, and to the spirit of the administrators—"sympathy without softness, tenacity, shrewdness, economy and energetic enthusiasm." But this is not a "public relations piece," for Mr. Gaitskell objectively admits to unsolved problems. No satisfactory agreement was ever reached on a reserve fund, on a profits equalization fund, or on ma-

chinery for handling the grievances of settlers.

Dr. Fabunmi, a Nigerian, has written an old-fashioned diplomatic history, which embraces some valuable summaries and interesting details of the negotiations surrounding the British withdrawal from the Sudan and from Suez, and on the rise of political activity in the Sudan. His viewpoint is moderately anti-British and his framework leads him to lament the ruthless pursuit of national interests through power—an agreeable but not profound approach. Food for further thought, however, are his conclusions concerning the drift of the Sudan into the Egyptian orbit.

1. Concluding a round-up of recent noteworthy articles in non-Africanist periodicals:

ON PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: •A. L. Adu, "Problems of Government in Emergent African States," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, v. 26, #1, 1960. Deals with the author's experience in Ghana with problems of adjustment, growth, control, and organization of the civil service. •David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," *World Politics*, v. 13, October 1960. Traditionalism is divided into two types, each reacting differently to change. The process of modernization is forced into different channels, illuminating viable political alternatives and consequent forms of government. A real contribution to comparative analysis. •Herbert J. Spiro, "New Constitutional Forms in Africa," *Ibid.* The author briefly and incisively shows "that the constitutional techniques, traditions and standards of the Old World are largely irrelevant to the novel problems of the New Africa" and indicates the reasonableness of some of the political forms emerging today, promising development of previous studies in constitutional engineering. •Rupert Emerson, "The Erosion of Democracy," *Journal of Asian Studies*, v. 20, November 1960. Seeks the collapse of democracy in Afro-Asia in a similarity of causes, surrounding the facts of "borrowed" constitutions, elitist traditions, and a shortage of trained leaders. •Elsbeth Huxley, "Freedom in Africa: the Next Stage," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, v. 36, Summer 1960. Two factors, not generally noted, are introduced to explain Africa's contemporary turmoil: the end of the enforced "boredom" of colonial rule and the egalitarian implications of the social revolution.

ON PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: •Edward Marcus, "Agriculture and the Development of Tropical Africa," *Land Economics*, v. 36, May 1960. Review of the difficulties in the way of agricultural advance, concluding that the "possibilities for improvement in the productiv-

ity of Tropical African agriculture is [sic] very limited." •F. Taylor Ostrander, "Problems of African Economic Development," *Orbis*, v. 4, Summer 1960. A review, noting in particular the overvaluation of the immediate possibilities of exploiting Africa's mineral wealth.

WEST AFRICA: •Leopold Sedar Senghor, "West Africa in Evolution," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 39, January 1961. An explanation of the dissolution of the Mali Federation and statement of "middle-of-the-road socialism." •Basil Davidson, "West Africa after Independence," *New Statesman*, v. 60, November 19, 1960. The next stage of striving for economic independence, the author believes, will be characterized by state socialism. •Peter Worsley, "One-Party Democracy in West Africa," *The Listener*, v. 64, August 4, 1960. The author suggests the analogy with the quasi-party system in Alberta, Canada. •The drift leftward in Guinea is treated in Denis Warner, "Chinese Bearing Gifts," *The Reporter*, v. 23, November 10, 1960, and in Lloyd Garrison, "The Strong Man of Guinea," *Ibid.* •Various aspects of the history, problems, and current scene in Nigeria, marking her independence are treated in Emily Hahn, "Though Tribe and Tongue May Differ," *New Yorker*, December 10, 1960; Bernard Levin, "Zik, Zik, Zik," *Spectator*, November 25, 1960: eye-witness descriptions of independence days in Lagos; Roland Oliver, "The Founder's Vision," *The Listener*, v. 64, November 17, 1960: on the "modernism" of Lord Lugard; Margery Perham, "A Prospect of Nigeria," *Ibid.*, October 20, 1960: the "inconsistency" of colonial rule by British democracy as its greatest contribution to free government in Africa; Yemi Babatunde, "What Next for Nigeria?" *New Leader*, v. 43, October 17, 1960: an optimistic report; Robert C. Good, "Africa's Gulliver," *Ibid.*, August 15-22, 1960: sees a conservative foreign policy for Nigeria; Basil Davidson, "And Now Nigeria," *New Statesman*, v. 60, October 1, 1960: notes that political conservatism stems from the influence of an indigenous Establishment. •Salfo Albert Balima, "Notes on the Social and Labor Situation in the Republic of Upper Volta," *International Labor Review*, v. 82, October 1960: reviews problems of migration and lack of opportunity for the absorption of semi-skilled workers.

THE CONGO: •Selected, varying attempts to unravel the skeins of politics are in Ann Morrissett, "Conversations with a Congolese Congressman," *Liberation*, September 1960, and "Cold War in the Congo," *Ibid.*, November, 1960; Robert Wuliger, "The Congo: Memories Shape the Future," *The Nation*, December 17, 1960; Henry L. Bretton, "Congo and Emergent Africa," *Ibid.*, October 15, 1960; Sol Tas, "Power Blocs and the Congo," *New*

Leader, October 17, 1960; Lloyd Garrison, "The New Heart of Darkness," *The Reporter*, v. 23, September 1, 1960; T. R. M. Creighton, "Congo: the Need for Compromise," *Spectator*, November 18, 1960; Harry Franklin, "Apotheosis of a Post Office Clerk," *Ibid.*, August 12, 1960. •Ethel M. Albert, "Socio-Political Organization and Receptivity to Change: Some Differences Between Ruanda and Urundi," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, v. 16, Spring 1960. Fascinating, readable analysis of separate forms of traditional society, each endemic to half of the Belgian Trust Territory. The differences explain varying patterns of development and bear significant implications for policy.

EAST AFRICA AND THE HORN: •Anthony S. Reyner, "Somalia: the Problems of Independence," *Middle East Journal*, v. 14, Summer 1960. A review, presenting "a distressing picture." •Leo Silberman, "Ethiopia: Power of Moderation," *Ibid.*, Spring 1960. Reviews the organization of government and political prospects, seeing Haile Selassie as the pillar of strength. •A. A. Castagno, "Conflicts in the Horn of Africa," *Orbis*, v. 4, Summer 1960. The proliferation of international problems creates a tinder box of tensions. •Gordon Shepherd, "Kenya Braces for Freedom," *The Reporter*, v. 23, November 10, 1960. Notes the dangers of a situation in which the Africans have a preponderance of power without sovereignty. •M. F. Hill, "The White Settlers' Role in Kenya," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 38, July 1960. A settler viewpoint, observing that the whites might accept African rule, but they will balk at the return of Kenyattism. •Ralph von Geredorff, "Endeavor and Achievement of Co-operatives in Mozambique," *Journal of Negro History*, v. 45, April 1960. A friendly, "positive" look at Portuguese policy.

CENTRAL AND SOUTH AFRICA: •Anthony Delius, "At the Cape of Desperate Hope," *The Reporter*, v. 23, September 1, 1960. Review of recent, depressing developments. •Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Social Distance Attitudes of South African Students," *Social Forces*, v. 38, March 1960. The use of an attitude questionnaire on white students at the University of Natal discloses that "results are strikingly similar to American findings" on race prejudice. •T. R. M. Creighton, "Law and Disorder," *Spectator*, November 11, 1960. A critical analysis of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Bill and Vagrancy Law of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. •N. M. Shamyarira, "The Coming Showdown in Central Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 39, January 1961. Review of recent tensions from an African moderate-nationalist viewpoint, finding the real enemies among the whites of Southern Rhodesia. •Alan Paton, "The New Africa," *New Leader*, v. 43, November 14, 1960.

Excerpts from the author's speech accepting the annual Freedom Award from Freedom House.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN POLICY: •Peter Lessing, "Problems of 'Pan-Africa,'" *The Listener*, September 23, 1960. Observes that the unity of Africa is only "a political slogan." •Yoram Shamir, "Africa Turns Toward Israel," *New Leader*, September 19, 1960. Israel's success in courting Africa's new states is put down to that nation's small size, cooperative economic system, experience with problems similar to Africa's and her "revolutionary" tradition. •Theodore Draper, "Ordeal of the UN, Khrushchev, Hammarskjöld and the Congo," *Ibid.*, section 2, November 7, 1960. Analysis of recent events, emphasizing the issue of the survival of the UN. •Peter Kilby, "American Aid to Emerging Africa," *Ibid.*, August 29, 1960. A brief, clear, and forceful presentation of America's shortcomings in this area and recommendations for changes. •W. Arthur Lewis, "Neutralism in Africa," *The Reporter*, v. 23, November 10, 1960. Review of factors making for non-alignment. Madeleine and Marvin Kalb, "Russia and/or China in Africa," *Ibid.*, October 13, 1960. Discusses the appeal of the Russians in particular, who are willing to support all forms of rebels, as long as they are strong and anti-West. •Mario Rossi, "Fiasco in the Congo," *New Republic*, December 19, 1960. Notes the decline of the UN and the dire consequences in store. •Helen Kitchen, "Africa and the Kennedy Era," *Ibid.*, December 12, 1960. Sees a refreshingly realistic turn in US policy toward Africa signified by the acceptance of expert judgments among the new policy-makers and in the appointment of G. Mennen Williams as Assistant Secretary of State.

LITERARY AFFAIRS: •Contrasting views of acceptability of the 'Negritude' movement in different parts of Africa are in Mercer Cook, "The Aspirations of 'Negritude,'" and in Ezekiel Mphahlele, "The Importance of Being Black," *New Leader*, October 24, 1960. •Harold R. Isaacs, "Five Writers and their African Ancestors," *Phylon*, v. 21, Fall and Winter 1960. Two articles tracing the roots (if any) of a number of important American Negro writers.

HEALTH: •K. R. S. Morris, "New Frontiers to Health in Africa," *Science*, v. 132, September 9, 1960. Notes that economic and social progress also mean the increased danger of rapidly-spreading epidemics, especially of sleeping sickness.

2. A new collection, "Mondes d'outre-mer," from Editions Berger-Levrault of Paris and under the general direction of Hubert Deschamps should fill a great void in our knowledge of the society and history of former French Africa. In the

"nations series," Realites Oubanguiennes, by Pierre Kalck (1959), 356 pages, concentrates on economic and social problems with a view toward the problems of modernization. The approach is broadly chronological; much use is made of official statistics and descriptions of policy. It contains a unique and valuable bibliography. In the "history series," History of Togo, by Roger Cornevin (1959), 432 pages, 19.50N.F., and History of Madagascar, by Hubert Deschamps (1960), 348 pages, 19.50 N.F., represent much-needed "standard" short histories of these new states. Although rather formal in approach, both authors aim at achieving sympathetic but impartial surveys. (History of the Peoples of Black Africa, by Roger Cornevin is announced as published, but has not been received.)

3. Apartheid, a socio-historical exposition of the origin and development of the apartheid idea, by N. J. Rhodes, M. A. and Prof. Dr. H. J. Venter (Cape Town and Pretoria: Haum, 1960), 268 pages, 35s.

African Socialism, a report to the Constitutive Congress of the Party of African Federation, by Leopold Sedar Senghor (N. Y.: American Society of African Culture, 1959), 49 pages, \$1.31.

Representing opposite ends of the ideological spectrum in contemporary Africa, each of these documents is required reading for serious observers. Apartheid is a sophisticated defense of that policy by two Afrikaner professors. The authors regard the policy as both "natural" and humanitarian, aiming at the "final emancipation of the Bantu." African Socialism, by the President of Senegal, charts a course of progress for the now-defunct Mali Federation. Its real value, however, lies in the author's attempt to define his ideology—an indigenous alternative to Communism and to capitalism.

4. The Economics of Trusteeship in Somalia, by Mark Karp (Boston: Boston University Press, 1960), 180 pages, \$4.50.

A re-oriented view of the relation of politics to economics, derived from the Austrian economist, E. Bohm-Bawerk, provides a touchstone for the analysis of economic problems of Somalia, as it moves from dependence to independence. The author treats Somalia as a case study "to demonstrate how economic forces can interfere with the attainment of political objectives and why attempts to cope with such forces by purely political methods are likely to prove futile." A taut, interesting study, although the uniqueness of the thesis remains arguable. Of particular interest to students is Dr. Karp's attack on the underlying notion of economic surplus, the chief support for the tra-

ditional theory of livestock accumulation ("the cattle complex"). More generally, the book sheds light on the problem of economic development in desperately poor areas.

5. The Friendship Press of New York has published paperback editions of a number of popular though serious surveys of Africa's problems, focusing on the role and contribution of Christianity. The impact of the Church on African society remains a critical area not yet satisfactorily analyzed. For that reason, the following books are welcome introductions: Africa Disturbed, by Emory and Myrta Ross, 183 pages, \$1.95; The Way in Africa, by George Wayland Carpenter, 165 pages, \$1.50; The Halting Kingdom, by John and Rena Karefa-Smart, 86 pages, \$1; Drum Call of Hope, by Gene Philips Clemes, 96 pages, \$1.50.

6. New reference books: Progress of the Non-Self-Governing Territories under the Charter, vol. 5. Territorial Surveys, (N. Y.: United Nations, 1960), 476 pages, \$5.50. Final volume of a Report to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General's Office of 10 years of UN efforts.

State of the Union, Economic, Financial and Statistical Year-Book for the Union of South Africa, 1959-60 (Johannesburg: DaGama Publications, 1960), 449 pages. Useful coverage of most aspects of the structure and institutions of South African life.

Handbook of Commerce and Industry in Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 4th ed., 1960), 338 pages, 15s. "Intended primarily for the use of businessmen;" comprehensive and up-to-date.

Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, edited by W. V. Brelsford, (London and Salisbury: Cassel for the Federal Information Department, 1960), 803 pages, 3 Gns. A long-awaited, first exhaustive reference book for the entire Federation.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED:

1. African Women Speak, edited by the National Catholic Welfare Conference office for UN Affairs (Maryknoll, N. Y.: Maryknoll Publications World Horizon Reports, 1960), 117 pages, \$1. A report of a regional seminar of the World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, held at Lome in 1958.

2. Nature Study for Africa, Birds, by G. F. Thistleton (London: Evans Bros., 1960), 128 pages, 10s. 6d. A text for teachers of natural history.

3. New journal: The International Development Review (Society for International Development, 1725 K St., N.W., Rm. 707, Washington 6, D. C.). Concerning international economic development and technical co-operation.



Governor G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

—Wide World Photo

New Man in Africa

G. Mennen Williams, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the new administration, is a skillful and indefatigable politician who reigned for six successive terms as Governor of Michigan, retiring still unbeaten for public office at the end of 1960. He will be 50 years old on February 23.

Although Governor Williams came from a soap-fortune background (hence his nickname "Soapy") and once was president of the Young Republicans club at Princeton University, he made his political mark as a New Deal Democrat. At Princeton, where he was graduated in 1933, he won a Phi Beta Kappa key for outstanding scholarship in the School of Public and International Affairs, while also earning two varsity letters in football. He earned his law degree from the University of Michigan in 1936.

After stints as Assistant Attorney General of Michigan and executive assistant to the United States Attorney General, he entered the Navy in 1942 as a lieutenant j.g. and subsequently served two and a half years aboard carriers in the Pacific. He came home from World War II with 10 battle stars, three Presidential Unit Citations,

and the Legion of Merit. By 1949 he was Governor of Michigan, and his political trademark—a polka dot bow tie—was to dominate Michigan politics for more than a decade.

Friendly and approachable, the new Assistant Secretary is awed by neither innovation nor protocol. A dedicated advocate of racial equality in the US, Governor Williams is said to have appointed more Negroes to responsible positions in his home state than any other American governor.

One of the few preconceptions about diplomacy which Mr. Williams brings to his new task is that an Ambassador's wife should play an active and responsible role in her husband's work. His own wife, Nancy Williams, sets a high standard, for she has always been a full-time partner in Governor Williams' political career and is already briefing herself for an early trip to Africa. A graduate of the University of Michigan School of Social Welfare, Mrs. Williams has made hundreds of professional and political speeches over the last decade, was a popular TV personality in her home state, and is an experienced and perceptive traveller. The Williams have three children—Gery, 19, Nancy, 17, and Wendy, 14.

Visitors . . .

K. C. OKORIE, Secretary and Regional Librarian of the Eastern Region Library Board, Nigeria, in the US until April 1962 to study organization and extension services of public libraries on a Carnegie Corporation grant. For further details, contact the Carnegie Corporation, 589 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

ADEGOKE OLUBUMMO, Lecturer in Mathematics at University College, Ibadan, Nigeria, in the US until December 1961 to study university education and research in functional analysis on a Carnegie Corporation grant. For further details, contact the Carnegie Corporation, 589 Fifth Avenue, New York 17, N.Y.

CIRE BA, Assistant Director of the Voltaic Republic Information Service, in the US until early May on a US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

The following educators are in the US until early March on the US State Department's International Teacher Development Program: MATTHIAS OGUTU, headmaster of the Butula Intermediate School, Bungoma, Kenya; STEPHEN KIONI, school master at St. John's Teacher Training College, Thika, Kenya; HENRY SERUKENYA, probational teacher at Masaka Technical School, Budu, Uganda; TIMOTHY RAMTU, assistant master at the Shimo-La-Tewa School, Mombasa, Kenya; JOSEPH SIPENDI, assistant education secretary-general of the Tanganyika Catholic Welfare Organization, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika; KESI JUMAN, assistant headmistress of the Ng'Ambo Girls School, Zanzibar; ABDULLA KARTAN, head teacher at the Fuoni Primary School, Zanzibar; PATRICK BRETT, headmaster of Morgan High School, Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia; JOSEPH MWEMBA, school master at Munali Secondary School, Munali, Northern Rhodesia; AGNES BEATRICE PRATT, principal of the Roosevelt Preparatory School, Freetown, Sierra Leone; and EDMUND COLE, teacher of Physics at Bo Government School, Freetown, Sierra Leone. For further details, contact Robert E. L. Crane, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington 25, DC.

Calendar

March 9-15: A leadership conference on American Policy Toward Africa, to be held at the Carnegie Endowment International Center, New York City, under the sponsorship of the American Committee on Africa. Participants include Senator Frank Moss of Utah, Congressman Charles Diggs of Michigan, Dr. Zelma George of the US delegation to the 15th UN General Assembly; and Oliver Tambo, Deputy President of the South African African National Congress. For details, contact the American Committee on Africa, 801 Second Avenue, New York 17, NY.

March 27-29: Conference on African Resources, sponsored by New York University and Africa Fair, Inc., to discuss problems of economic growth in Africa. Participants include representatives from Africa, and US businessmen, educators and government officials. To be held at the Washington Square Center of New York University. For further details, contact the conference's staff headquarters, 6 Washington Square, North, New York City, NY.

A collection of African children's paintings from the Cyrene Mission and Canon Paterson's Africa Art School in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, is scheduled for exhibition as follows: Bergstrom Art Center, Neenah, Wisconsin, February 19-March 19; Museum of Art, Greenville, South Carolina, April 1-22; and Eastern Washington College of Education, Cheney, Washington, May 10-31. The collection, owned by Mrs. Harold Hochschild of Princeton, New Jersey, is available at nominal rentals for exhibition in schools and museums.

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